Security starts with saying what exists.

Unit tests exercise parser paths, normalization, validation conflicts, Behavior Score coverage, browser-storage migrations, SDK address resolution, launch input/preflight failures, strict event parsing, JUSTYPE attribution filtering, exact Q64.96 price math, candle aggregation, trade-route validation, and isolation of internal fixtures from public genesis.

An isolated Robinhood mainnet fork exercised atomic fees-off and fees-on launches, duplicate rejection, canonical UERC20 metadata and supply, PoolId/PoolKey, LP-position NFT custody, one real buy, one real sell, and browser launch-to-chart flow. Fork success is integration evidence, not a mainnet deployment or audit.

The production nginx configuration adds HTTPS redirection, HSTS, MIME sniffing protection, same-origin framing, a strict-origin referrer policy, and disables camera, microphone, and geolocation through Permissions Policy. Those headers reduce specific web risks; they do not make the application or future contracts secure by default.

Reown AppKit exposes the connected public address; it never gives JUSTYPE a seed phrase or private key. Connection alone approves nothing. With the production launch flag off, the UI cannot broadcast a launch transaction.

If Classic launch is separately activated, the one launch CTA requests one zero-value transaction to the canonical Uniswap LiquidityLauncher on Robinhood Chain. Its current SDK-resolved target is 0x0000FffFBE8efE702c8703aE3477FF5dE3d319C0. The atomic multicall creates a fixed 1,000,000,000-supply, 18-decimal UERC20, transfers the entire supply into InstantLaunchStrategy, initializes a hookless TOKEN / ETH v4 pool, and mints the launch LP position.

The LP NFT is held permanently by the canonical FeeSplitter shown in Review. Fees-off routes all LP fees to compounding. Fees-on currently gives the registered beneficiary 40% of native-side LP fees and 0% of token-side LP fees, with the remainder compounding; these values and the strategy come from the pinned SDK.

When a server-side Uniswap API key is configured, JUSTYPE requests a real exact-input quote and validates that the route is hookless v4, includes the displayed PoolId, targets chain 4663, and belongs to the connected wallet. A buy asks the wallet to submit the validated Universal Router transaction. A sell may first require token approval, Permit2 approval or signature, followed by the swap transaction. Each request remains visible in and controlled by the wallet.

If the key is absent, the trading panel shows an unavailable state and no placeholder quote. JUSTYPE never optimistically invents a confirmed trade; it refreshes from PoolManager Swap logs after the receipt.

No JUSTYPE contract source or bytecode exists. There is no JUSTYPE admin model, upgrade policy, rule custody path, hook access control, invariant audit, or deployed programmable address. Stock/USDG execution, staking, rewards, behavior fees, limits, and claims remain disconnected.

There is also no documented bug bounty, private vulnerability inbox, disclosure policy, or response SLA.

A future Hook Engine requires a new threat model and security program: contract-level invariants, callback/reentrancy analysis, delta settlement checks, custody and routing review, access and oracle assumptions, deployment provenance, tests against adversarial pools/tokens, independent audits, and a responsible disclosure channel.

The only configured official contact is @justypedotfun on X. Because it is a public social channel, request an appropriate private reporting path before sharing sensitive exploit details. No response time is promised.

Never send a seed phrase, private key, password, or funds. For support scope, read Support.